June 18, 1940
House of Commons
I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the
French High Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the
moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and
on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French
divisions and threw out of action for the critical period the whole of the
British Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed
rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of their cannon,
vehicles and modern equipment. This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair,
and in the first two of those weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we
consider the heroic resistance made by the French Army against heavy odds in
this battle, the enormous losses inflicted upon the enemy and the evident
exhaustion of the enemy, it may well be the thought that these 25 divisions of
the best-trained and best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However,
General Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British divisions or their
equivalent were able to stand in the line with their French comrades. They have
suffered severely, but they have fought well. We sent every man we could to
France as fast as we could re-equip and transport their formations.
I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination. That I judge to
be utterly futile and even harmful. We cannot afford it. I recite them in order
to explain why it was we did not have, as we could have had, between twelve and
fourteen British divisions fighting in the line in this great battle instead of
only three. Now I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the
historians, when they have time, will select their documents to tell their
stories. We have to think of the future and not of the past. This also applies
in a small way to our own affairs at home. There are many who would hold an
inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Governments-and of
Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the years which led up to this
catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for the guidance of
our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. There are too
many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search his speeches. I
frequently search mine.
Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the
present, we shall find that we have lost the future. Therefore, I cannot accept
the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the present Government. It
was formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all
sections of opinion. It has received the almost unanimous support of both Houses
of Parliament. Its Members are going to stand together, and, subject to the
authority of the House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight
the war. It is absolutely necessary at a time like this that every Minister who
tries each day to do his duty shall be respected; and their subordinates must
know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are here today and gone
tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and faithfully obeyed.
Without this concentrated power we cannot face what lies before us. I should not
think it would be very advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this
afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are not clear that will
be clear in a short time. We are to have a secret Session on Thursday, and I
should think that would be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions
of opinion which Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss vital
matters without having everything read the next morning by our dangerous foes.
The disastrous military events which have happened during the past fortnight
have not come to me with any sense of surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight
ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst possibilities were open;
and I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make
no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, '~f
necessary for years, if necessary alone." During the last few days we have
successfully brought off the great majority of the troops we had on the line of
communication in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France
since the beginning of the war-that is to say, about 350,000 out of 400,000
men-are safely back in this country. Others are still fighting with the French,
and fighting with considerable success in their local encounters against the
enemy. We have also brought back a great mass of stores, rifles and munitions of
all kinds which had been accumulated in France during the last nine months.
We have, therefore, in this Island today a very large and powerful military
force. This force comprises all our best-trained and our finest troops,
including scores of thousands of those who have already measured their quality
against the Germans and found themselves at no disadvantage. We have under arms
at the present time in this Island over a million and a quarter men. Behind
these we have the Local Defence Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a
portion of whom, however, are yet armed with rifles or other firearms. We have
incorporated into our Defence Forces every man for whom we have a weapon. We
expect very large additions to our weapons in the near future, and in
preparation for this we intend forthwith to call up, drill and train further
large numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are employed during the vast
business of munitions production in all its branches-and their ramifications are
innumerable-will serve their country best by remaining at their ordinary work
until they receive their summons. We have also over here Dominions armies. The
Canadians had actually landed in France, but have now been safely withdrawn,
much disappointed, but in perfect order, with all their artillery and equipment.
And these very high-class forces from the Dominions will now take part in the
defence of the Mother Country.
Lest the account which I have given of these large forces should raise the
question: Why did they not take part in the great battle in France? I must make
it clear that, apart from the divisions training and organizing at home, only 12
divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified their being sent
abroad. And this was fully up to the number which the French had been led to
expect would be available in France at the ninth month of the war. The rest of
our forces at home have a fighting value for home defence which will, of course,
steadily increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of Great Britain
would at this time require the transportation across the sea of hostile armies
on a very large scale, and after they had been so transported they would have to
be continually maintained with all the masses of munitions and supplies which
are required for continuous battle-as continuous battle it will surely be.
Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all, we have a Navy. Some people
seem to forget that we have a Navy. We must remind them. For the last thirty
years I have been concerned in discussions about the possibilities of oversea
invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the
beginning of the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be sent out of the
country. That was a very serious step to take, because our Territorials had only
just been called up and were quite untrained. Therefore, this Island was for
several months particularly denuded of fighting troops. The Admiralty had
confidence at that time in their ability to prevent a mass invasion even though
at that time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10
to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general engagement every day
and any day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy ships worth speaking
of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. We are also told that the Italian Navy is
to come out and gain sea superiority in these waters. If they seriously intend
it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor Mussolini a free
and safeguarded passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may
play the part to which he aspires. There is a general curiosity in the British
Fleet to find out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the
last war or whether they have fallen off at all.
Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on a great scale is
concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it today than we were at many
periods in the last war and during the early months of this war, before our
other troops were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now, the
Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or
10,000 men flung suddenly across and thrown ashore at several points on the
coast some dark night or foggy morning. The efficacy of sea power, especially
under modern conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large size; It
has to be of large size, in view of our military strength, to be of any use. If
it is of large size, then the Navy have something they can find and meet and, as
it were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even five divisions, however
lightly equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships, and with modern air
reconnaissance and photography it would not be easy to collect such an armada,
marshal it, and conduct it across the sea without any powerful naval forces to
escort it; and there would be very great possibilities, to put it mildly, that
this armada would be intercepted long before it reached the coast, and all the
men drowned in the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with their equipment
while they were trying to land. We also have a great system of minefields,
recently strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the channels. If the
enemy tries to sweep passages through these minefields, it will be the task of
the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to protect
them. There should be no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at
sea.
Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on which we have
relied during many years in peace and war. But the question is whether there are
any new methods by which those solid assurances can be circumvented. Odd as it
may seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty, whose prime
duty and responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne expedition before it
reaches, or at the moment when it reaches, these shores. It would not be a good
thing for me to go into details of this. It might suggest ideas to other people
which they have not thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of
their ideas in exchange. All I will say is that untiring vigilance and
mind-searching must be devoted to the subject, because the enemy is crafty and
cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The House may be assured
that the utmost ingenuity is being displayed and imagination is being evoked
from large numbers of competent officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly
up to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring vigilance
and untiring searching of the mind is being, and must be, devoted to the
subject, because, remember, the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he
will not do.
Some people will ask why, then, was it that the British Navy was not able to
prevent the movement of a large army from Germany into Norway across the
Skagerrak? But the conditions in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way
like those which prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the
distance, we could give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently,
lying as we did close to the enemy's main air power, we were compelled to use
only our submarines. We could not enforce the decisive blockade or interruption
which is possible from surface vessels. Our submarines took a heavy toll but
could not, by themselves, prevent the invasion of Norway. In the Channel and in
the North Sea, on the other hand, our superior naval surface forces, aided by
our submarines, will operate with close and effective air assistance.
This brings me, naturally, to the great question of invasion from the air, and
of the impending struggle between the British and German Air Forces. It seems
quite clear that no invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces
to crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our Air Force has
been definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there may be raids by parachute
troops and attempted descents of airborne soldiers. We should be able to give
those gentry a warm reception both in the air and on the ground, if they reach
it in any condition to continue the dispute. But the great question is: Can we
break Hitler's air weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have
not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the most powerful enemy within
striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful Air Force which
has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men and in many types of
machine, to what we have met so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which
have been fought with the Germans. In France, where we were at a considerable
disadvantage and lost many machines on the ground when they were standing round
the aerodromes, we were accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much as
two and two-and-a-half to one. In the fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of
no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force, and gained the mastery
of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three or four to one day after day.
Anyone who looks at the photographs which were published a week or so ago of the
re-embarkation, showing the masses of troops assembled on the beach and forming
an ideal target for hours at a time, must realize that this re-embarkation would
not have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering air
superiority at that time and at that place.
In the defense of this Island the advantages to the defenders will be much
greater than they were in the fighting around Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the
rate of three or four to one which was realized at Dunkirk; and in addition all
our injured machines and their crews which get down safely-and, surprisingly, a
very great many injured machines and men do get down safely in modern air
fighting-all of these will fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly.
soil and live to fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and
their complements will be total losses as far as the war is concerned.
During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to.
the French Army, both by fighters and bombers; but in spite of every kind of
pressure we never would allow the entire metropolitan fighter strength of the
Air Force to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right,
because the fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively
affected even if we had thrown in our entire fighter force. That battle was lost
by the unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforeseen
power of the armoured columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army
in numbers. Our fighter Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere
accident in that great struggle, and then we should have found ourselves at the
present time in a very serious plight. But as it is, I am happy to inform the
House that our fighter strength is stronger at the present time relatively to
the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been; and
consequently we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the war
in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I look
forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these splendid men,
this brilliant youth-who will have the glory of saving their native land, their
island home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks.
There remains, of course, the danger of bombing attacks, which will certainly be
made very soon upon us by the bomber forces of the enemy. It is true that the
German bomber force is superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large
bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in Germany
without intermission. I do not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which
lies before us; but I believe our countrymen will show themselves capable of
standing up to it, like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up
to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the
world. Much will depend upon this; every man and every woman will have the
chance to show the finest qualities of their race, and render the highest
service to their cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere, our
station, our occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the famous
lines: He nothing common did or mean, Upon that memorable scene.
I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House and the country
some indication of the solid, practical grounds upon which we base our
inflexible resolve to continue the war. There are a good many people who say,
"Never mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to tyranny-and
such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself from them. But I can assure them
that our professional advisers of the three Services unitedly advise that we
should carry on the war, and that there are good and reasonable hopes of final
victory. We have fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions,
these great communities far beyond the oceans who have been built up on our laws
and on our civilization, and who are absolutely free to choose their course, but
are absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves
inspired by the same emotions which lead me to stake our all upon duty and
honour. We have fully consulted them, and I have received from their Prime
Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of Australia, Mr. Fraser of
New Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa-that wonderful man, with his
immense profound mind, and his eye watching from a distance the whole panorama
of European affairs-I have received from all these eminent men, who all have
Governments behind them elected on wide franchises, who are all there because
they represent the will of their people, messages couched in the most moving
terms in which they endorse our decision to fight on, and declare themselves
ready to share our fortunes and to persevere to the end. That is what we are
going to do.
We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our position worsened since the
beginning of the war? It has worsened by the fact that the Germans have
conquered a large part of the coast line of Western Europe, and many small
countries have been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air
attack and adds to our naval preoccupations. It in no way diminishes, but on the
contrary definitely increases, the power of our long-distance blockade.
Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war increases the power of our
long-distance blockade. We have stopped the worst leak by that. We do not know
whether military resistance will come to an end in France or not, but should it
do so, then of course the Germans will be able to concentrate their forces, both
military and industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the House
these will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion has become more imminent,
as no doubt it has, we, being relieved from the task of maintaining a large army
in France, have far larger and more efficient forces to meet it.
If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries of the countries
he has conquered, this will add greatly to his already vast armament output. On
the other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of
immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all
kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots from the
Dominions and across the oceans coming from regions which are beyond the reach
of enemy bombers.
I do not see how any of these factors can operate to our detriment on balance
before the winter comes; and the winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi
regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel,
which, for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget
that from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always
possible for Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this country, together with
any other devices of invasion she might conceive, and that France could have
done little or nothing to prevent her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under
this danger, in principle and in a slightly modified form, during all these
m6nths. In the meanwhile, however, we have enormously improved our methods of
defence, and we have learned what we had no right to assume at the beginning,
namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual British pilot have a
sure and definite superiority. Therefore, in casting up this dread balance sheet
and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great reason for
intense vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or despair.
During the first four years of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but
disaster and disappointment. That was our constant fear: one blow after another,
terrible losses, frightful dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at the end of
those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than that of the Germans,
who had moved from one aggressive triumph to another, and who stood everywhere
triumphant invaders of the lands into which they had broken. During that war we
repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going to win? and no one was
able ever to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly,
quite unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so glutted
with victory that in our folly we threw it away.
We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance
will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire overseas. The French
Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their
future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty
obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will
have read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and
of our own hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in
French history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle.
However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or other French
Governments, we in this Island and in the British Empire will never lose our
sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure
what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage, and if final
victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be
restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do
we recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes
to our own. All these shall be restored.
What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the
Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of
Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long
continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the
enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us
in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be
free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But
if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all
that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age
made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted
science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves
that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men
will still say, "This was their finest hour."
